




























John	Cottingham,	Philosophy,	Religion	and	Spirituality		 9	Spiritual	exercises	are	typically	multivalent	–	they	work	on	many	different	levels,	including	the	emotional,	the	physical,	the	aesthetic	and	the	moral;	and	it	is	important	to	add	that	they	operate	in	ways	that	are	not	always	directly	accessible	to	the	conscious	reflective	mind.	A	paradigm	case	of	a	spiritual	practice,	familiar	from	the	Benedictine	and	other	monastic	traditions,	is	the	singing	of	Psalms.	This	originally	involved	learning	the	complete	set	by	heart	and	reinforcing	the	memory	through	regular	repetition,	day	by	day	and	month	by	month.	But	the	recitation	is	no	mere	intellectual	exercise,	but	an	embodied	ritual,	involving	physical	movements	of	standing	and	sitting	and	bowing,	the	taking	up	of	each	verse	antiphonally,	by	alternating	sides	of	the	choir,	and	of	course	the	music,	the	plainsong	chant,	which	not	only	requires	careful	breathing	and	close	attention	to	the	rhythm	of	the	words,	but	a	constant	listening	by	each	singer,	to	match	his	intonation	to	that	of	his	neighbours.	32	One	reason	that	music	is	so	important	here	is	that	its	effects	on	us,	both	as	listeners	and	as	participants,	engage	the	whole	person,	physically,	emotionally,	intellectually,	and	also	in	deeper,	more	diffusive	ways,	operating	below	the	threshold	of	consciousness,	which	we	scarcely	understand.	Music	at	its	best	(and	the	same	goes	for	the	finest	literature	and	visual	art)	have	this	ineffable	quality	–	they	speak	to	something	deep	within	us,	yet	at	the	same	time	somehow	take	us	outside	ourselves	to	a	more	exalted	plane.	Such	music	is,	as	T.	S.	Eliot	put	it	in	one	of	his	most	religiously	sensitive	poems:		 music	heard	so	deeply	That	it	is	not	heard	at	all,	but	you	are	the	music		While	the	music	lasts.	These	are	only	hints	and	guesses,		Hints	followed	by	guesses;	and	the	rest		Is	prayer,	observance,	discipline,	thought	and	action.33		 The	ability	of	great	art	to	generate	‘self-transcendence’	is	something	that	many	secularists	are	happy	to	acknowledge;	indeed	some	have	suggested	that	all	we	need	of	a	‘spiritual’	kind	can	be	supplied	by	music,	art	or	literature,	thus	making	religion	redundant.	Salmon	Rushdie	has	argued	that	literature	can	and	ought	to	fill	this	role,	and	aim	to	capture	what	he	calls	‘the	soaring	quality	of	transcendence’:		It	is	for	art	to	capture	that	experience,	to	offer	it	to,	in	the	case	of	literature,	its	readers;	to	be,	for	a	secular,	materialist	culture,	some	sort	of	replacement	for	what	the	love	of	god	offers	in	the	world	of	faith.34		But	one	problem	with	this	kind	of	position	is	that	the	implied	exclusive	dichotomy	between	the	domain	of	religion	on	the	one	hand	and	the	domain	of	art	on	the	other	is	in	many	respects	misleading.	For	clearly	some	of	the	greatest	visual	art	and	literature	and	music	in	our	culture	is	inherently	religious.	Those	who	juxtapose	art	and	religion	as	opposites	may	well	have	in	mind	a	very	one-sided	image	of	religion	as	what	is	purveyed	by	fundamentalists	who																																																									32	Further	discussion	the	multivalent	aspects	of	psalm	singing	and	other	spiritual	practices	may	be	found	in	John	Cottingham,	‘Theism	and	Spirituality’	in	C.	Taliaferro,	V.	Harrison,	and	S.	Goetz	(eds),	The	
Routledge	Companion	to	Theism	(New	York:	Routledge,	2013),	Ch	50,	pp.	654-665.	33	T.	S.	Eliot,	‘The	Dry	Salvages’	[1941],	subsequently	incorporated	into	Four	Quartets	[1943].	I	am	grateful	to	Jay	Parini	for	his	comments	on	this	passage	in	a	talk	on	‘Eliot’s	Four	Quartets	as	a	Pattern	for	Christian	Living’,	given	at	Heythrop	College,	London	in	May	2016.	34	Salmon	Rushdie,	‘Is	Nothing	Sacred?’,	in	Imaginary	Homelands:	Essays	and	Criticism	1981-1991	(London:	Granta,	1991),	p.	425-6.	Cited	in	Rebecca	Stott,	‘The	Wetfooted	Understory:	Darwinian	Immersions’,	in	G.	Levine	(ed.),	The	Joy	of	Secularism	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2011),	p.	206.	For	a	similar	argument	that	art	can	and	should	be	a	replacement	for	religion,	see	Alain	de	Botton	and	John	Armstrong,	Art	as	Therapy	(London:	Phaidon,	2013).		
John	Cottingham,	Philosophy,	Religion	and	Spirituality		 10	subscribe	to	rigid	dogmas	and	literalist	interpretations	of	the	Bible.	Such	fundamentalist	approaches	are,	of	course,	to	be	found;	but	elsewhere,	for	example	in	the	great	liturgical	heritage	of	Catholic	and	Anglican	and	Orthodox	Christianity,	one	can	find	forms	of	spirituality	that	are	inextricably	intertwined	with	some	of	the	most	resonant	and	‘soaring’	literature	and	art	and	music	that	humanity	has	ever	produced.	An	even	more	important	aspect	of	religious	spirituality,	which	provides	a	further	reason	to	suppose	there	is	something	suspect	about	the	project	of	replacing	it	with	art,	is	that	it	has	an	overwhelmingly	moral	purpose.	Art	of	a	secular	kind	is	answerable	to	all	sorts	of	standards,	some	detached	from	any	moral	concerns	whatsoever;	but	the	overriding	aim	of	authentic	spiritual	praxis	is	to	facilitate	the	emergence	of	a	better	self,	purged	of	wasteful	and	destructive	and	self-absorbed	inclinations	and	desires,	and	able	to	begin	the	task	of	growing,	no	doubt	slowly	and	painfully,	into	the	self	one	was	meant	to	be	–	in	short	to	embark	on	the	traditional	Benedictine	task	of	self-transformation,	or	‘conversion	of	life’.35	We	are	back	with	the	Socratic	idea	of	‘care	of	the	soul’.		 Moving	our	attention	from	spiritual	praxis	to	the	other	component	of	spirituality	we	have	been	focusing	on,	namely	spiritual	experience,	we	find	that	the	pervasive	moral	dimension	is	even	more	apparent.	An	experience	that	was	merely	diverting	or	titillating,	or	shocking	or	entertaining	or	enjoyable,	or	even	just	very	emotionally	moving,	could	not	count	as	a	spiritual	experience;	there	has	to	be	something	deeper,	more	resonant	and	more	meaningful	for	the	life	of	the	subject	and	his	or	her	moral	development.		 Such	experience	takes	a	specifically	theistic	form	in	many	remarkable	passages	in	the	Hebrew	Bible,	as	in	one	of	the	Psalms	where	the	speaker	is	overwhelmed	by	a	sense	of	divine	power.	God	is	described	as	the	one	who	‘breaks	the	cedars	of	Lebanon	and	makes	Lebanon	skip	like	a	calf’,	who	‘shakes	the	wilderness	and	strips	the	forests	bare,	while	all	in	the	temple	cry	“Glory”’.36	The	cry	of	‘Glory’	(in	Hebrew	kavod	דוֹבָכּ)	signifies	something	weighty	with	significance,	sacred,	mysterious,	a	manifestation	of	the	divine,	as	conveyed	in	the	description	of	the	pillar	of	fire	and	cloud	which	led	the	Israelites	out	of	Egypt,	or	the	cloud	atop	Mount	Sinai	where	God’s	law	was	manifest	to	Moses.37	We	are	not	talking	of	‘natural	beauty’	in	the	attenuated	modern	sense,	but	of	something	fearful	that	calls	forth	reverence	and	awe,	like	the	burning	bush,	flaming	but	never	consumed,	where	Moses	was	told	to	keep	his	distance.38	These	are	not	‘impressive	sights’,	of	the	kind	familiar	from	television	nature	programmes,	but	events	pregnant	with	moral	significance,	as	is	clear	from	the	lines	from	an	earlier	Psalm,	where	the	forests	are	said	to	‘sing	for	joy’	because	the	world	is	to	be	judged.39	In	psychological	or	phenomenological	terms,	what	is	happening	here	is	an	experience	where	the	subject	is	overwhelmed	by	the	power	and	beauty	of	nature	in	a	way	that	is	somehow	intertwined	with	awareness	of	one’s	own	weakness	and	imperfection,	and	a	sense	of	confrontation	with	the	inexorable	demands	of	justice	and	righteousness.	In	short,	the	spiritual	experience	in	question	involves	the	kind	of	awareness	which	enables	one	to	see	the	world	transfigured,	so	that	it	is	irradiated	with	meaning	and	value,	and	the	human	subject,	caught	up	in	that	mystery,	is	unmistakeably	called	on	to	be	no	longer	a	spectator,	a	mere	‘tourist’,	but	to	respond,	to	be	a	morally	responsive	agent,	part	of	a	cosmos	that	is	shot	through	with	the	divine.																																																									35	The	Rule	of	St	Benedict,	dating	from	the	sixth	century	AD,	speaks	in	Chapter	58	of	a	conversatio	
morum,	a	difficult	term	to	translate,	but	one	which,	as	the	context	makes	clear,	implies	a	continuous	reshaping	and	renewal	of	one’s	habits	of	behaviour,	character	and	entire	way	of	life.	36	Psalm	29	[28]:	5-9.	My	discussion	of	this	and	the	following	examples	(from	Exodus	and	Isaiah)	of	spiritual	experience	as	it	figures	in	the	Bible	is	based	on	a	passage	from	Chapter	5	of	Cottingham,	How	
to	Believe.	37	Exodus	13:21;	16:10;	24:16.	38	Exodus	3:5.	39	Psalm	96	[95]:	11-13.	
John	Cottingham,	Philosophy,	Religion	and	Spirituality		 11		 The	upshot	of	all	this	is	that	spiritual	experience	in	what	I	have	been	calling	its	‘cosmic’	dimension	is,	in	today’s	somewhat	awkward	philosophical	jargon,	‘normative’:	we	are	dealing	with	intensely	personal	encounters,	infused	with	awe	and	charged	with	moral	significance,	where	the	individual	feels	him	or	herself	to	be	checked,	to	be	scrutinized,	and	to	be	called	upon	to	respond	and	to	change.		 In	the	work	of	many	creative	artists,	by	contrast,	particularly	in	the	last	two	centuries,	we	see	a	resistance	to	any	kind	of	alignment	between	art	and	morality.	Yet	one	can	certainly	point	to	some	non-religious	works	of	art	which	do	seem	to	have	a	morally	demanding	aspect40	And	it	is	also	true	that	certain	non-theistic	meditative	forms	of	spirituality	such	as	those	found	in	Buddhism	and	other	Eastern	traditions,	have	ethical	teachings	attached	to	them.	But	the	goals	that	are	sought	in	those	traditions,	and	enthusiastically	taken	up	by	the	secularists	we	referred	to	earlier	–	involving	notions	like	impersonal	and	boundless	oceanic	wellbeing	–	seem	to	have	an	essentially	quietist	character.	The	paramount	objective	is	achieving	bliss	by	detaching	oneself	from	the	stressful	world	of	struggle,	commitment	and	dependency.	To	be	sure,	many	of	the	Eastern	sages	are	famous	for	enjoining	right	conduct	and	the	practice	of	virtue,	so	in	this	sense	there	is	an	ethical	component	involved.	But	it	is	not	a	component	that	is	intrinsically	connected	to	the	underlying	vision	of	the	cosmos;	for	the	Eastern	vision	is	one	in	which	personal	commitments	and	demands	are	based	on	an	illusion,	and	ultimate	reality	is	simply	an	impersonal	continuum	of	conditions	that	arise	and	pass	away.	There	is	a	fundamental	contrast	here	with	the	kind	of	sacred	vision	found	in	some	of	the	passages	from	the	Bible	quoted	above,	or	with	that	of	Isaiah,	when	he	sees	the	temple	shaking	and	billowing	with	smoke,	and	the	earth	and	heaven	filled	with	God’s	glory	(here	again	we	have	the	term	that	is	so	prominent	in	Jewish	spirituality,	kavod).41	For	when	the	prophet	witnesses	this	vision,	his	first	reaction	is	to	cry	‘Woe	is	me!’	The	experience	he	has	involves	a	vivid	intermingling	of	the	aesthetic	with	the	moral,	and	even	as	he	is	overwhelmed	by	the	‘glory’,	he	acutely	feels	his	own	failures	and	those	of	his	people,	so	that	he	forthwith	resolves	to	try	to	set	things	right.	Such	a	vision,	radically	different	from	vague	oceanic	feelings	of	wellbeing	and	oneness,	is	a	‘normative’	vision	–	one	that	carries	with	it	inescapable	demands.	It	is	a	vision	that	makes	no	sense	without	the	two	poles	of	the	human	condition	that	Blaise	Pascal	underlined–	our	wretchedness,	or	sinfulness,	and	our	redeemability	would	we	but	turn	towards	the	good.42			
5	.Coda:	philosophy	and	the	spiritual	It	has	been	no	part	of	my	purpose	in	this	paper	to	disparage	the	recent	interest	in	spirituality	among	contemporary	atheist	thinkers	–	on	the	contrary,	I	think	it	is	thoroughly	to	be	welcomed.	But	the	favourable	interpretation	of	theistic	spirituality	offered	above,	together	with	the	reservations	expressed	about	alternative	non-theistic	forms,	may	suggest	to	some	readers	that	this	paper	has,	as	it	were,	imperialistic	ambitions,	and	aims	to	browbeat	those	who	describe	themselves	as	spiritual	into	admitting	that	they	are	really	theists	whether	they	know	it	or	not.	But	polemical	arguments	seldom	provide	much	enlightenment	in	philosophy,	and	would-be	coercive	philosophical	strategies	rarely	succeed	in	getting	anyone	to	shift	their	position.	What	I	have	been	aiming	to	do,	in	a	much	lower	key,	is	to	suggest	that	when	we																																																									40	A	possible	example	may	be	found	in	Rainer	Maria	Rilke’s	sonnet	Archaïscher	Torso	Apollos	[from	Der	
Neuen	Gedichte	anderer	Teil,	1908],	which	I	translate	and	discuss	in	‘The	Self,	The	Good	Life,	and	the	Transcendent’,	in	N.	Athanassoulis	and	S.	Vice	(ed.),	The	Moral	Life:	Essays	in	Honour	of	John	
Cottingham	(Oxford:	Blackwell,	2007),	pp.	255-6.		41	Isaiah	6:	1-4.		42	Misère	de	l’homme	sans	Dieu	.	.	.	Félicité	de	l’homme	avec	Dieu.	Blaise	Pascal,	Pensées	[1670],	ed.	L.	Lafuma	(Paris:	Seuil,	1962),	no	6.	
John	Cottingham,	Philosophy,	Religion	and	Spirituality		 12	unpack	exactly	what	is	involved	in	the	activities	and	experiences	we	call	spiritual,	it	is	not	easy	to	make	fully	adequate	sense	of	spirituality,	and	of	its	importance	for	human	life,	without	a	something	very	close	to	a	theistic	framework.		The	theologian	Karl	Rahner	once	used	the	term	‘anonymous	Christians’	to	describe	those	who	do	not	adopt,	or	have	never	heard	of,	the	Christian	faith,	but	who	may	nevertheless	achieve	salvation	through	good	works	and	through	following	their	consciences,	albeit,	unbeknownst	to	them,	none	of	this	would	have	been	possible	but	for	the	salvific	sacrifice	of	Christ.43	The	phrase	‘anonymous	Christian’	is	a	controversial	one	which	has	irritated	many	critics,	but	for	present	purposes	we	may	perhaps	extract	from	it	a	simple	philosophical	point,	namely	that	one	may	respond	to	a	divine	reality	without	doing	so	under	that	description	(just	as	someone	may	be	aware	of	a	flash	of	lightening,	but	not	be	aware	of	it	under	the	description	‘electrical	discharge’).	Applying	this	to	case	in	hand,	the	gist	of	my	argument	has	been	that	the	profound	importance	for	human	life	of	those	deep	transformative	experiences	we	call	‘spiritual’,	together	with	the	moral	response	that	is	demanded	from	us	through	the	working	of	such	experiences,	provides	some	support	for	thinking	the	reality	glimpsed	in	such	experiences	is	of	the	kind	envisaged	by	a	theistic	worldview,	even	though	it	may	not	be	experienced	under	that	description.	For	either	the	moral	demand	is	an	illusion	(something	that	those	who	take	spiritual	experience	seriously	are	unlikely	to	want	to	say),	or	else	there	is	something	in	the	nature	of	the	cosmos	that	grounds	the	demand.	If	there	are	indeed	‘irreducibly	normative	truths’44	that	we	access	through	such	experiences	–	moral	truths,	in	other	words,	that	are	not	reducible	to	factual	truths	about	the	natural	world,	which	have	objective	authority	over	us	and	require	us	to	act	in	certain	ways	–	these	will	not	fit	easily	within	the	prevailing	naturalistic	conception	of	the	world	in	which	in	which	there	is	no	objective	source	of	authority	or	normativity,	and	where	the	only	ultimate	constituents	of	the	world	are	the	physical	objects	studied	by	science.45	All	this	brings	us	back,	in	conclusion,	to	the	role	of	philosophy	in	the	deeper	of	the	two	Socratic	senses	referred	to	at	the	start	of	this	paper,	namely	what	Pierre	Hadot	has	called	‘philosophy	as	a	way	of	life’	–	something	of	profound	moral	importance	that	impinges	on	the	entire	character	and	purpose	of	one’s	existence.46	In	this	deeper	sense,	philosophy	is	part	of	a	process	of	radical	interior	change	–	metanoia	is	the	Greek	term	–	a	change	of	heart,	a	change	of	the	kind	that	leads	to	a	fundamental	shift	in	the	flow	and	direction	of	one’s	life.47	As	we																																																									43	‘Anonymous	Christianity	means	that	a	person	lives	in	the	grace	of	God	and	attains	salvation	outside	of	explicitly	constituted	Christianity.	Let	us	take	a	Buddhist	monk,	who,	because	he	follows	his	conscience,	attains	salvation	and	lives	in	the	grace	of	God:	of	him	I	must	say	that	he	is	an	anonymous	Christian…	If	I	hold	that	everyone	depends	upon	Jesus	Christ	for	salvation,	and	if	at	the	same	time	I	hold	that	many	live	in	the	world	who	have	not	expressly	recognized	Jesus	Christ,	then	there	remains	in	my	opinion	nothing	else	but	to	take	up	this	postulate	of	an	anonymous	Christianity.’	Karl	Rahner	in	
Dialogue	(Spring	Valley,	NY:	Crossroads	Publishing,	1959),	p.	135	(slightly	adapted).	44	The	phrase	is	Derek	Parfit’s,	in	On	What	Matters	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011),	Part	II,	p.	464.	It	should	be	added	that	although	Parfit	recognizes	the	objectivity	and	‘irreducible	normativity’	of	these	authoritative	moral	demands,	he	denies	that	there	need	be	anything	whatsoever	in	reality	that	grounds	these	truths.	45	If	naturalism	fails,	it	is	of	course	theoretically	possible	that	the	ultimate	nature	of	the	cosmos	might	be	such	as	to	accommodate	other	realities,	of	a	non-theistic	kind	(such	as	Platonic	forms	perhaps),	which	might	ground	irreducibly	normative	truths	of	the	kind	accessed	in	spiritual	experience.	Another,	more	interesting	possibility	is	that	such	normativity	might	be	grounded	in	what	Fiona	Ellis	has	called	an	‘enriched’	or	‘expansive’	naturalism;	see	her	God,	Value,	and	Nature	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2014).	These	possibilities	cannot	be	explored	and	evaluated	with	the	space	available	in	the	present	paper.	46	See	note	6,	above.	47	In	its	New	Testament	usage,	the	term	metanoia	may	be	translated	‘repentance’	or	‘conversion’;	cf.	Acts	of	the	Apostles:	‘God	hath	granted	repentance	unto	life’	(metanoian	eis	zoēn)’	(11:18).	
John	Cottingham,	Philosophy,	Religion	and	Spirituality		 13	have	seen,	spiritual	practice	in	its	traditional	forms	has	aimed	at	just	that	–	though	one	should	perhaps	add	that	philosophical	inquiry	tends	to	contribute	to	this	process	at	an	intellectual	and	reflective	level,	while	the	practices	of	spirituality	characteristically	engage	more	directly	with	a	whole	range	of	emotional,	imaginative	and	behavioural	responses.	But	the	truth	of	theism,	if	it	is	true,	completes	this	picture	in	the	most	satisfying	way	possible,	by	ensuring	that	the	process	of	change	has	an	ultimate	goal,	being	directed	towards	that	which	is	objectively	good	and	that	wherein	our	ultimate	fulfilment	lies.	Or,	to	close	with	a	phrase	from	Michel	Foucault,	‘there	is,	in	the	truth	and	in	the	access	to	it,	something	which	fulfils	the	subject	and	completes,	or	transfigures,	the	very	being	of	the	subject.’48	
																																																								48	Foucault,	The	Hermeneutics	of	the	Subject,	p.	16.	I	am	most	grateful	to	the	editor	of	this	volume,	David	McPherson,	for	extremely	helpful	comments	on	an	earlier	draft	of	this	paper.	
